Late on January 10, 2022, Kansas City police officers stopped a pickup truck with a broken headlight and expired license plate. The driver, Alonzo Miller, was not the vehicle’s owner and could not provide proof of insurance. The officers recognized the area Miller had driven from as one known for criminal activity. During the stop, Miller exhibited nervous behavior. A computer check revealed Miller was on probation and parole for a violent felony involving a firearm. The officers, noting a significant age difference between Miller and his passenger and the late hour, suspected possible illicit activity. After Miller mentioned “something under there” when asked about illegal items and consented to a vehicle search, the officers asked him to step out. Miller behaved unusually, triggering further suspicion. As an officer attempted a frisk, Miller resisted, and a firearm discharged from his coat pocket. Miller was arrested and later indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm. Miller appeals the case, arguing that officers unlawfully extended the stop and the subsequent frisk was not supported by reasonable suspicion.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri denied Miller’s motion to suppress evidence from the stop and search. The magistrate judge found the stop lawful, that Miller’s consent to search was voluntary, and that the officers had reasonable suspicion to extend the stop and frisk Miller based on the totality of the circumstances—including Miller’s criminal history, behavior, and responses during the encounter. The district court adopted these findings. Miller then entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the denial of Miller’s suppression motion, applying de novo review to legal conclusions and clear error review to factual findings. The court held that, under the totality of the circumstances, the officers had reasonable suspicion to extend the stop, request consent to search the vehicle, and frisk Miller. The judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Us v. Miller

During a PC search of Charles’ vehicle, a Glock handgun was located with a 3D printed device attached to it which allowed the firearm to operate in a fully automatic manner. Charles was charged with unlawful possession of a machine gun. Charles filed an appeal stating that his 2nd amendment right allowed him to “bear arms”.

The appelate court decided Charles possession of the “machine gun” is not protected by the Second Amendment. Machine guns are not in common use by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes and therefore fall within the category of dangerous and unusual weapons that the government can prohibit for individual use.

US v. Charles

Defendant had sold pills containing fentanyl to someone working with an undercover officer on 9/20/2023. Later the same day, officers responded to Williams’s apartment for a report of a domestic. Officers located drugs, paraphernalia, and later two firearms in his vehicle. Williams was charged with possessing a dangerous weapon in connection with a drug trafficking offense. Williams argues that the court erred in its ruling that the enhancement did not apply since the firearms were not related to the drug transaction.

The district court did not clearly err in making the finding that the two-level enhancement applied. See United States v. Young, 689 F.3d 941, 946 (8th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he presence of a firearm in a location where it could be used to protect drugs can be sufficient evidence to prove the requisite connection.”).

US v. Tyree Williams

Ray Calvert was driving a rental car when an Arkansas state trooper stopped him for illegal lane changes. While waiting for dispatch to run criminal history reports, the passenger who rented the car consented to a search. The trooper found 2- bundles of methamphetamine in the glove box. After the district court denied Calvert’s motion to suppress the evidence, he pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance. Calvert argues that the stop was unconstitutional. He claims he didn’t commit a traffic violation, so the trooper lacked reasonable suspicion for the stop. Calvert also claims that the trooper unreasonably prolonged the stop.

the district court credited the trooper’s testimony that he believed Calvert illegally changed lanes. That finding is not clearly erroneous, and a traffic violation justifies a stop. (“Any traffic violation, however minor, provides probable cause for a traffic stop.” (citation omitted)); United States v. Herrera-Gonzalez, 474 F.3d 1105, 1109 (8th Cir. 2007) (even an officer’s mistaken belief that a violation occurred can justify a stop as long as the belief was objectively reasonable). An officer may detain a motorist while completing “certain routine tasks related to the traffic violation,” including checking drivers’ licenses and criminal histories. Here, twelve minutes into the stopand before dispatch had returned the criminal history check, the passenger consented to a search. The trooper could extend the stop while he conducted the search. United States v. Rivera, 570 F.3d 1009, 1013 (8th Cir. 2009) (when motorist consents to search, “he necessarily consents to an extension of the traffic stop while the search is conducted”).

US v. Calvert

Shue Moua was convicted by a jury of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. The conviction stemmed from a traffic stop conducted by Deputy Nils Hansen, who observed Moua’s erratic behavior at a gas station and suspected she was impaired. During the stop, Hansen noted several signs of impairment and discovered methamphetamine in Moua’s vehicle during an inventory search after her arrest. Moua moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the search, arguing that the traffic stop was invalid and unreasonably prolonged. A magistrate judge recommended granting the motion, finding that Hansen lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop.

the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota overruled this recommendation, concluding that Hansen had reasonable suspicion based on Moua’s impaired behavior and vehicle registration issues. The district court also found that the stop was not unreasonably extended. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the district court’s decision. The appellate court found that Deputy Hansen had reasonable suspicion to stop Moua’s vehicle based on her erratic driving and the absence of visible registration tags. The court also determined that the stop was not unreasonably prolonged, as Hansen’s suspicions evolved during the encounter, justifying further investigation.

US v. Moua

Britt Lander was stopped by police in June 2022, and drug paraphernalia and methamphetamine were found in his vehicle. After being read his Miranda rights, Lander requested the presence of his partner, whom he jokingly referred to as his attorney. The officer denied this request and continued the interrogation, during which Lander made incriminating statements about his involvement in methamphetamine trafficking. Lander was subsequently indicted for conspiring to distribute methamphetamine after a prior felony drug conviction.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa denied Lander’s motion to suppress his statements, concluding that his waiver of Miranda rights was voluntary and that his request for his partner was not a clear invocation of his right to counsel. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court held that Lander’s waiver of his Miranda rights was voluntary, as he appeared to understand the situation despite his claims of intoxication and sleep deprivation. The court also found that Lander’s request for his partner was not a clear and unequivocal request for an attorney.

US v. Lander

After a welfare check was requested by his fiancée, Joseph Maser was involved in a standoff with police at his suburban Iowa home. Maser had threatened suicide, fired a gun inside his house, and was reportedly intoxicated with access to firearms. Officers attempted to negotiate with Maser for nearly an hour, during which Maser became increasingly agitated and made threats. Maser exited his garage holding a rifle, ignored commands to drop the weapon, and raised the rifle outward from his body. Officer Joshua Van Brocklin, perceiving a threat, shot Maser twice in the chest. Maser survived and subsequently brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Officer Van Brocklin used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. Following a decision by the Iowa Supreme Court in Burnett v. Smith, which foreclosed excessive force claims under the Iowa Constitution, the district court granted summary judgment on those claims. The district court also granted summary judgment for Officer Van Brocklin on the federal excessive force claim, finding no constitutional violation and awarding qualified immunity. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo. The court held that, under the totality of the circumstances, Officer Van Brocklin’s use of deadly force was objectively reasonable because Maser’s actions—raising a rifle outward after repeated noncompliance and threats—created an imminent threat of serious harm. The court found no genuine dispute of material fact and affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment, holding that Maser’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated.

Maser v. City of Coralville

Tayvin Galanakis sued Officers Nathan Winters and Christopher Wing alleging they arrested him without probable cause. The district court denied summary judgment in part, determining that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity or state statutory immunity, and the City was subject to vicarious liability on a surviving state-law claim.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on Galanakis’s Fourth Amendment claim, concluding that no objectively reasonable officer could have concluded that there was a substantial chance Galanakis had driven while under the influence of marijuana. The court found that Galanakis evinced almost no indicia of intoxication and that his behavior during the stop did not suggest impairment.

Galanakis v. City of Newton

Devin Ledbetter was seriously injured by Springfield, Missouri police officer Brandon Helmers. Ledbetter sued Helmers claiming Helmers used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The incident occurred when Helmers and his partner responded to a 911 call about a man holding a woman captive in a tent. Ledbetter, who was in the tent, exited holding a knife. The accounts of what happened next differ, with Helmers claiming Ledbetter was non-compliant and threatening, while Ledbetter claimed he immediately dropped the knife and was compliant. Ledbetter sustained severe injuries, including a fractured hip, during the arrest.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri denied Helmers’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, noting disputed facts about the threat Ledbetter posed and the amount of force used. The case proceeded to trial, but the jury could not reach a verdict on liability. However, they answered special interrogatories, finding Helmers reasonably believed Ledbetter posed an immediate threat but did not believe Ledbetter was resisting arrest. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that a reasonable jury could find Helmers used excessive force, given the evidence and the jury’s special findings. However, the court also held that it was not clearly established that Helmers’s use of force was excessive under the circumstances, as existing case law did not provide sufficient guidance for the specific situation Helmers faced. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s judgment granting Helmers qualified immunity.

Ledbetter v. Helmers

Minnesota State Troopers stopped Ricky Cobb, II during the early morning hours for driving without headlights. Shortly after the stop, Trooper Seide learned Cobb was wanted for a felony violation of a protective order. Seide, along with Trooper Londregan and another officer, received instructions from the Ramsey County Sheriff’s Office to arrest Cobb. When the troopers attempted to take Cobb into custody, he refused to exit his vehicle and shifted his car into drive, causing the vehicle to move forward with one trooper partially inside. In response, Trooper Londregan shot Cobb, who then drove a short distance before his car was stopped by the troopers. Cobb was removed from the vehicle and died at the scene.

The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota reviewed the case after Nyra Miller-Fields, representing Cobb’s estate, brought a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The suit alleged that the troopers’ actions constituted an unreasonable seizure and excessive force in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court considered body and dash camera evidence and granted the troopers’ motion to dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity, concluding that the troopers’ conduct did not violate clearly established constitutional rights.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the troopers had reasonable suspicion to extend the stop and probable cause for Cobb’s arrest based on the protective order violation. It further held that the use of deadly force by Trooper Londregan did not violate a clearly established constitutional right in the specific context of this case, given the immediate risk to officer safety. The Eighth Circuit concluded that the troopers were entitled to qualified immunity and affirmed the dismissal of the claims.

On December 25, 2019, a patrol sergeant noticed a van idling in a driveway, twice encountered it, and approached the vehicle. The driver, Raymond Kelley, identified himself and his residence. The sergeant observed signs of alcohol and learned Kelley had a prior DUI and an active warrant. Kelley exited, was patted down, and sat on a wall; after asking to call his wife and being denied, Kelley ran up the driveway. The sergeant pursued and tackled Kelley, gaining control of his wrist. A deputy arrived after Kelley was tackled and assisted with handcuffing. Kelley complained of an arm injury, received medical attention, and was cited for public intoxication and resisting law enforcement before being released. Disputed facts center on the degree of Kelley’s resistance and the force used during handcuffing.

Kelley sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging unlawful arrest and excessive force against the officers in both their official and individual capacities. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas granted summary judgment to the officers on the false arrest claim and on all claims against them in their official capacities. However, the court denied qualified immunity to both officers on the excessive force claim in their individual capacities, finding that disputed facts about Kelley’s conduct and the techniques used precluded summary judgment and should be resolved by a jury.

Reviewing this interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit determined that the district court erred by failing to construe disputed facts in the light most favorable to Kelley and by not completing the required two-prong qualified immunity analysis. The Eighth Circuit vacated the district court’s order denying qualified immunity and remanded the case for a more detailed assessment, instructing the district court to consider both prongs of the qualified immunity analysis after properly construing the facts.

Kelley v. Pruett, No. 24-3084 (8th Cir. 2026) :: Justia

Deputy Brian Williams responded to a domestic-violence call at Tina Hight’s residence, where two dogs ran out toward him as Hight opened her door. Williams shouted warnings and fired a shot that caused the dogs to retreat. As Hight attempted to bring her dogs inside, a small Pomeranian mix ran toward Williams, prompting him to fire again in the dog’s direction. The shot missed the dog but ricocheted and struck Hight, leaving a bullet fragment in her leg.

Hight filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas, alleging excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court granted summary judgment to Deputy Williams on the basis of qualified immunity, concluding that Williams did not violate Hight’s constitutional rights.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, making all reasonable inferences in favor of Hight. The appellate court considered whether Deputy Williams’s actions constituted a Fourth Amendment seizure of Hight. Applying the requirement that a seizure by force must involve an officer’s objectively manifested intent to restrain the person affected, the court found no evidence that Williams intended to restrain Hight; his actions and statements were aimed at stopping the dog. The court held that accidental force, or force directed at another target, does not satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s seizure standard as articulated in Torres v. Madrid and related precedents.

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that Deputy Williams did not seize Hight within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and thus did not violate her constitutional rights. The court declined to address arguments raised for the first time on appeal.

Hight v. Williams, No. 24-2998 (8th Cir. 2026) :: Justia

Law enforcement in South Dakota, while investigating a drug trafficking operation, asked an officer to stop a car leaving a surveilled apartment building. The officer conducted a traffic stop of the driver, Alex Johnson, for excessive window tint. Johnson admitted his license was suspended. The officer received confirmation of the suspension within six minutes. Although he had all the information necessary to issue a ticket for driving without a license and a warning for the window tint, the officer delayed finalizing and delivering the paperwork. Instead, he waited for a K9 unit to arrive and conversed about unrelated matters. After the K9 alerted to the car, a search revealed drugs and paraphernalia. Police later searched Johnson’s apartment and found additional drugs. The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota denied Johnson’s motion to suppress the evidence from both the car and his apartment. The district court determined that the officer would have completed the traffic stop paperwork by about twenty minutes if he had acted diligently. However, it held that the delay was permissible under the community caretaking exception, as Johnson could not legally drive the car away due to his suspended license. The court further found that the apartment evidence was admissible because it was not the fruit of an unlawful search. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the officer unreasonably prolonged the traffic stop beyond the time necessary to address the traffic violations, as there was no active effort or plan to remove the car for safety reasons. The community caretaking function did not justify the extended detention. Accordingly, the appellate court ruled that all evidence from the car and the subsequent apartment search should have been suppressed. The court reversed the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress, vacated Johnson’s conviction, and remanded for further proceedings.

United States v. Johnson, No. 21-3954 (8th Cir. 2026) :: Justia

Police officers in Des Moines executed an arrest warrant for Tyrone Cameron, who was wanted for First-Degree Murder and had a history of violent crime. Officers surrounded a house where Cameron was hiding, and one officer brought a trained canine, Bero. When Cameron was spotted attempting to flee by jumping from the roof, Officer Meunsaveng released Bero without giving Cameron a warning. Bero caught Cameron, who did not resist further or reach for weapons as officers handcuffed him. After Cameron was secured, Officer Meunsaveng removed Bero. Cameron later sued the City of Des Moines, Officer Meunsaveng, and other officers, alleging excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and related tort claims under Iowa law.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa granted summary judgment to all defendants. It found that Officer Meunsaveng did not use excessive force and had not violated any clearly established rights. As a result, claims against other officers for failing to intervene, as well as claims against the police chief and the City for failure to train, were denied. The district court also dismissed Cameron’s common law tort claims, reasoning that the absence of excessive force under federal law meant those claims could not succeed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that Cameron raised a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Officer Meunsaveng violated a clearly established right by failing to warn before releasing Bero. The court reversed summary judgment on this claim. On all other claims—including the use of Bero to hold Cameron and the method of removing Bero—the court affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. The court remanded the Iowa common law tort claims to the district court for further consideration.

Cameron v. City of Des Moines, No. 24-3383 (8th Cir. 2026) :: Justia

Police officers stopped a vehicle after observing a traffic violation near a gas station known for gang and drug activity. Upon running the vehicle’s registration, they identified Marwan Hamdan, a known gang affiliate on parole for a prior firearm offense, as a co-owner. During the stop, officers questioned the occupants about their parole status, relationships, drug and alcohol use, and the presence of weapons. As the stop progressed, police requested identification from all passengers and performed record checks, including for an individual in a nearby vehicle who was believed to be associated with violence. After backup arrived, officers conducted pat-down searches and discovered an open container of alcohol. A subsequent search led to the discovery of a firearm in the glove box, resulting in Hamdan’s detention and federal charge for being a felon in possession.

A United States Magistrate Judge in the District of South Dakota held an evidentiary hearing and recommended denial of Hamdan’s motion to suppress evidence, finding officers had reasonable suspicion for the stop and for further investigation. The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota adopted the amended report and recommendation, concluding the stop was valid and the officers lawfully developed reasonable suspicion during the encounter. The motion to suppress was denied.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. The court held that the officers did not impermissibly extend the traffic stop in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, the use of radio dispatch for record checks, the request for a records search of a nearby individual, and the questioning of the driver did not unlawfully prolong the stop. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress the firearm evidence.

United States v. Hamdan, No. 24-3108 (8th Cir. 2026) :: Justia

After protests in Des Moines, Iowa, escalated into rioting and looting at a mall in late May 2020, law enforcement was deployed to restore order and clear the area. A special police team, including Deputy Jason Tart, was authorized to use less-lethal munitions such as impact rounds. Monica Perkins, who had attended a vigil elsewhere, arrived near the mall area with her daughter. After an argument between Perkins and another driver on a nearby road, Deputy Tart fired an impact round that struck Perkins in her hand, injuring her. Perkins sued the City, various police officials, and Deputy Tart, alleging constitutional violations including excessive force and failure to intervene.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa granted summary judgment to all defendants on every claim. The district court found that Perkins was not “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and even if she had been, Deputy Tart was entitled to qualified immunity. The court also held that Deputy Tart’s conduct did not amount to a substantive due process violation and that, because there was no underlying constitutional violation, the failure-to-intervene claim against other officers could not stand.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Eighth Circuit agreed with the district court, holding that Deputy Tart’s actions did not objectively manifest an intent to restrain Perkins and thus did not constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The court further found no evidence that Deputy Tart’s conduct was conscience-shocking under the Fourteenth Amendment and concluded he was entitled to qualified immunity. As a result, the failure-to-intervene claim against the other officers also failed. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to all defendants.

Perkins v. City of Des Moines, No. 24-1375 (8th Cir. 2026) :: Justia

During unrest following the death of George Floyd in May 2020, a large crowd gathered outside the Minneapolis Police Department’s Fifth Precinct after a citywide curfew had been imposed due to ongoing violence and destruction. Raven Bartz joined the crowd, which she characterized as peaceful, though widespread chaos and threats to public safety were documented that night. As police attempted to clear the area, officers deployed various crowd-control measures. Bartz was struck in the head by a projectile fired from a less-lethal launcher by Officer Conan Hickey while fleeing after a blast ball was thrown. She sustained a laceration requiring staples but was released from the hospital without a concussion diagnosis.

Bartz filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota against Officer Hickey and the City of Minneapolis, alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, a Monell claim alleging unconstitutional policies or customs, and a state law battery claim. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the federal claims, finding that even assuming a seizure occurred, Officer Hickey’s actions were reasonable in light of the chaotic and dangerous circumstances. The court found that qualified immunity applied and dismissed the Monell claim for lack of an underlying constitutional violation. It declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo. The court held that, under the totality of circumstances—including the violence, curfew violations, and threats faced by officers—Officer Hickey’s use of force was objectively reasonable and did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Without a constitutional violation, the Monell claim failed. The appellate court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Bartz v. City of Minneapolis, No. 24-2875 (8th Cir. 2026) :: Justia

A man whose only prior felony conviction had been expunged by a Missouri state court was arrested by a Missouri State Highway Patrol trooper for possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. The trooper had accessed his criminal history report, which still listed the expunged conviction with a notation indicating it was “Closed Pursuant to Chapter 610 RSMo.” However, the Missouri State Highway Patrol did not train officers to understand this notation meant the conviction was expunged and could not serve as a basis for arrest. The man informed the trooper of his expungement at the scene, but she stated she had to rely on the report’s information.

Following his arrest, the plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Missouri state court, asserting claims for damages and prospective relief against the Highway Patrol’s superintendent and others. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri. The superintendent moved to dismiss the official-capacity claim on sovereign immunity grounds and the individual-capacity failure-to-train claim on qualified immunity grounds. The district court denied both motions, prompting the defendants to file an interlocutory appeal.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of immunity de novo. The appellate court held that the current superintendent was a proper Ex parte Young defendant for purposes of prospective relief, as he had sufficient connection to the dissemination practices that risked future constitutional violations. The court also held that the plaintiff had plausibly alleged a Fourth Amendment violation and deliberate indifference by the former superintendent regarding failure to train. Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of sovereign and qualified immunity.

Cunningham v. Olson, No. 24-3261 (8th Cir. 2026) :: Justia

Law enforcement officers in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, observed activity consistent with drug transactions in the parking lot of Jim’s Foods, a location known for narcotics activity. Officers saw a man leave a nearby house, interact with vehicles, and enter the back seat of a Chevrolet Cruze, with Antonio Clarence Robertson in the front seat. After further observation, including witnessing a hand-to-hand transaction, officers noticed the Chevy leave its parking spot and exit the lot without coming to a complete stop before entering the roadway. The officers initiated a traffic stop for violation of Iowa Code § 321.353, which requires vehicles emerging from private driveways to stop before entering public roads. A search, conducted with the driver’s consent, uncovered prescription pills and marijuana on Robertson, leading to his charge for possession with intent to distribute.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa heard Robertson’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the stop, which he argued was unlawful because the parking lot did not qualify as a “private driveway” under Iowa law. The district court found the officers’ testimony credible regarding the private nature of the lot and concluded the stop was lawful. Robertson pled guilty but reserved his right to appeal the suppression ruling.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. The appellate court held that the officers had an objectively reasonable basis to believe a traffic violation occurred, as the lot was not open to the public as a matter of right and thus was a “private driveway” within the meaning of Iowa law. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress and upheld the conviction.

United States v. Robertson, No. 25-2338 (8th Cir. 2026) :: Justia